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I. INTRODUCTION
For over a generation, injuries arising from motor vehicle ac-
cidents occurring in Minnesota have been controlled by the "No-
Fault Automobile Insurance Act."' Since it was originally enacted,
the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act has undergone
t Partner, Jardine, Logan & O'Brien, PLLP, Saint Paul, MN. J.D., 1983,
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coverage.
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a number of legislative amendments and has been interpreted by
the courts. Significant parts of the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile
Insurance Act are the provisions that relate to tort thresholds. As
will be shown, ample case law provides guidance as to dealing with
tort thresholds.
Within the last several years, empirical studies have been pub-
lished based on information gathered from the late 1970s to the
present, discussing the effects of no-fault insurance generally, tort
thresholds, and the costs of motor vehicle accident insurance.
In 1997, in the first session of the 105th Congress, a bill enti-
fled the "Auto Choice Reform Act of 1997" was introduced in the
United States Senate.' The "Auto Choice Reform Act" has been
touted as a means of cutting costs for auto insurance premiums and
promoting choice for those procuring auto insurance.
This paper will discuss tort thresholds in Minnesota, empirical
studies on automobile claims and motor vehicle accident insurance
and the "Auto Choice Reform Act of 1997."
II. TORT THRESHOLDS
A. Case Evaluation
As with any tort case, the motor vehicle accident case must be
properly evaluated. The overwhelming majority of cases will be
minor and will involve an insignificant amount of economic dam-
ages largely comprised of medical expenses and wage loss.
4
2. See INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, AUTO INJURIES: CLAIMING BEHAVIOR &
ITS IMPACT ON INSURANCE COSTS (1994); Stephen J. Carroll & James S. Kakalik, No-
Fault Approaches to Compensating Auto Accident Victims, 60 J. RISK & INS. 265 (1993);
INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN AUTO INJURY CLAIMS, ANALYSIS OF CLAIM
COSTS (1996); INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN AUTO INJURY CLAIMS,
ANALYSIS OF CLAIM FREQUENCY (1996);James K. Hammitt & John E. Rolph, Limiting
Liability for Auto Accidents: Are No-Fault Tort Thresholds Effective? 7 LAW & POL'Y 493
(1985); INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN AUTO INJURY CLAIMS, ANALYSIS OF
CLAIM FREQUENCY (2d ed. 1995); INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN AUTO
INJURY CLAIMS, ANALYSIS OF CLAIM COSTS (2d ed. 1995); Jeffrey O'Connell, et al.,
The Costs of Consumer Choice for Auto Insurance for States Without No-Fault Insurance, 54
MD. L. REV. 281 (1995); Jeffrey O'Connell, et al., The Comparative Costs of Allowing
Consumer Choice for Auto Insurance In All Fijfty States, 55 MD. L. REv. 160 (1996); Jef-
frey O'Connell, et al., Consumer Choice In The Auto Insurance Market, 52 MD. L. REv.
1016 (1993).
3. Auto Choice Reform Act of 1997, S.625, 105th Congress, 1st Sess. (1997).
4. See INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, AUTO INJURIES: CLAIMING BEHAVIOR &
ITS IMPACT ON INSURANCE COSTS 31 (1994).
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If a party is injured in a motor vehicle accident, and she wants
to recover economic and non-economic damages from those re-




3. One of the tort thresholds.5
As to negligence and cause, Minnesota is a comparative fault
state. In order for a claimant to recover, the claimant must be
50%, or less, at fault.6 This article will not focus on proving negli-
gence and causation for motor vehicle accident cases. Instead, it
will focus, in part, on tort thresholds.
It has been said that the No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act
has placed an "additional element of the cause of action" for motor
vehicle accident cases. Obviously, the logical next step is to deter-
mine what is this additional element that must be proved in order
to recover against a third party from a motor vehicle accident case.
The thresholds are set forth in Minnesota's No-Fault Automobile
Insurance Act.7 The thresholds are described injury instructions as
follows:
MEDICAL EXPENSE THRESHOLD
The reasonable value of medical supplies and hospital and
medical expenses necessary for treatment of the plaintiff,
up to the time of trial, includes the following:
(1)The reasonable expenses incurred by the plaintiff for
medical supplies and hospital and medical services; plus
(2)The value of free medical or surgical care or ordinary
and necessary nursing services performed by a relative of
the plaintiff or member of the plaintiffs household; plus
(3)The amount by which the value of medical services or
products provided exceeds the amount of medical ex-
pense benefits paid for those services or products, if the
plaintiff was charged less than the average reasonable
amount charged in Minnesota for similar services or
products.
You must separately determine the expenses that were in-
5. See Murray v. Walter, 269 N.W.2d 47,50 (Minn. 1978).
6. See MINN. STAT. § 604.02 (1996); Olson v. City of St. James, 380 N.W.2d
555 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
7. MINN. STAT. § 65B.51, subd. 3 (1996).
1998]
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curred for diagnostic x-rays and the expenses that were
incurred for rehabilitation, unless those expenses were in-
curred for rehabilitative occupational training or physical
therapy.
DISFIGUREMENT THRESHOLD
A disfigurement is that which impairs or injures the ap-
pearance of a person.
PERMANENT INJURY THRESHOLD
A permanent injury is one from which it is reasonably cer-
tain a person will not fully recover. Such injury may im-
prove or worsen, but must be reasonably certain to con-
tinue to some degree throughout the person's life.
60-DAY DISABILITY THRESHOLD
Disability means that the injured person is unable to en-
gage in substantially all of the person's usual and custom-
ary daily activities, for 60 days. Sixty days does not mean
60 consecutive days. It is sufficient if the total number of
days of disability was 60 days.8
In addition, if a death arises out of the motor vehicle accident,
a tort threshold has been met.9 Simply put, a claimant seeking to
recoup non-economic damages from a third party must prove that,
as a result of the motor vehicle accident, the claimant suffered one
of the following:
1. Health care expenses in excess of $4,000;
2. Permanent injury;
3. Disability of 60 days or more;
4. A scar;
5. Death.
In other words, even if the claimant was a passenger or admit-
tedly has no causal fault in a motor vehicle accident, that claimant
will not recover non-economic damages unless one of these tort
thresholds are met. So, when evaluating whether a claimant has a
viable action against a third party for non-economic damages, keep
in mind the claimant must prove negligence, cause, and one of the
tort thresholds. If all of these items cannot be proved, the claim-
8. MINNESOTA DIST. JUDGES ASS'N COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES,
MINNESOTAJURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES (CIVIL) JIG 600 (Michael K. Steenson & Pe-
ter Knapp, reps.) in 4 MINN. PRACTICE 402-05 & Spec. Verdict Form No. 8, at 167-
68 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1997).
9. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.51, subd. 3(4) (b) (3) (1996).
[Vol. 24
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ant's action for non-economic damages will fail.
B. Pleading
1. Claiming Non-Economic Damages
Since the No-Fault Act came into existence and was subse-
quently interpreted by the various appellate courts, it has become
as clear as spring water that the claimant must plead not only neg-
ligence, causation and damage, but also must plead an additional
element of her cause of action, namely, that one of the tort thresh-
olds has been met. That tort threshold must be pled regardless of
whether the claimant is asserting a claim for non-economic dam-. 10
ages by way of complaint or counterclaim. It is interesting to note
that when the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure were initially
adopted, proposed "forms" were published with the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Procedure to give attorneys and others advice as to
how to plead a given action. Those forms have not been updated
since 1951. Form 8 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure
presently reads as follows:
(1) On June 1, 1948, in a public highway called University
Avenue, in St. Paul, Minnesota, defendant negligently
drove a vehicle against plaintiff, who was then crossing
said highway.
(2) As a result, plaintiff was thrown down and had his leg
broken and was otherwise injured, was prevented from
transacting his business, suffered great pain of body
and mind, and incurred expenses for medical atten-
tion and hospitalization in the sum of $1,000.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against de-
fendant in the sum of $10,000.00 and costs.
This 1951 form, contained within the 1998 Minnesota Rules of
Civil Procedure, is misleading. It is amply clear that persons seek-
ing economic and non-economic damages arising from the negli-
gent operation of a motor vehicle, must plead and prove a tort
threshold before they are entitled to recover any damages. 2 "The
tort threshold is an additional element of the negligence action de-
10. See Murray v. Walter, 269 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1978).
11. MINN. R. CW. P. Form 8.
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scribed in § 65B.51, subd. 1, which must be pleaded and proved to
recover damages for non-economic detriment.""
A prudent claimant, then, should plead the typical negligence,
cause and damage matters but should also plead the additional
element of a tort threshold having been met. Such tort threshold
may be pled as follows:
Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 6513.51, subd. 3, (1990), plain-
tiff has met one or more of the prerequisites necessary to
recover damages for non-economic detriment.
14
A claimant, by Complaint or Counterclaim, should plead neg-
ligence, cause, damages and that additional element that one of
the tort thresholds have been met. Such a well-pled claim should
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
2. Defending against Non-Economic Damages
When answering a claim for non-economic damages, there are
some defenses that should be asserted in addition to the typical de-
fenses asserted under Minnesota's Comparative Fault Statute. 15 Two
allegations ought to be considered for inclusion in an answer. The
first defense is as follows:
The plaintiff has failed to prove one of the prerequisites
necessary to maintain an action under Minn. Stat. §
6513.51, subd. 3, (1990).
This affirmative allegation puts the plaintiff on notice that the
defense is claiming that the tort thresholds have not been met and,
accordingly, the claims for non-economic damages (i.e., "all digni-
tary losses suffered by any person... , including pain and suffering,
loss of consortium, and inconvenience" 16 ) are not recoverable. The
defense to the claim for economic damages should also, where ap-
propriate, make the following affirmative allegation:
The defendant is insured pursuant to the provisions of the
Minnesota No-Fault Insurance Act, Minn. Stat. § 65B.41
(1996) et seq and pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 65B.51, is enti-
fled to have deducted from any recovery, the value of ba-
13. Nemanic, 337 N.W.2d at 669 (citing Murray v. Walter, 269 N.W.2d 47, 50
(Minn. 1978)).
14. 1 MAYNARD PIRSIG, PIRSIG ON MINNESOTA PLEADING § 490 (5th ed. 1987);
see Moose Club v. LaBounty, 442 N.W.2d 334, 338 (Minn. Ct. App.), review denied,
(Minn. 1989).
15. MINN. STAT. § 604.02 (1996); seeMINN. R. Civ. P. 8.02 & 8.03.
16. MINN. STAT. § 65B.43, subd. 8 (1996).
[Vol. 24
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sic or optional economic loss benefits paid or payable or
which would be payable but for any applicable deducti-
ble. 7
This affirmative allegation should preserve the right to claim a no-
fault off-set after a verdict has been rendered.
C. Discovery of Threshold Information
1. Written Discovery
After issue is joined, written discovery should be interposed to
ferret out information regarding the tort thresholds. Towards that
end, it is advisable for the claimant to serve interrogatories asking
for all facts upon which the defense premises its position that tort
thresholds have not been met. Expert witness interrogatories
should be served pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure. 18 Where
appropriate, a claimant may want to interpose request for admis-
sions, seeking an admission that one or more of the tort thresholds
have been met.19
Conversely, a person defending against a motor vehicle acci-
dent claim ought to serve interrogatories inquiring about all of the
health care expenses incurred, whether the claimant missed work,
sustained a scar, or was otherwise unable to engage in her normal
or usual customary activities. It would be prudent to demand
authorizations for the release of the claimant's no-fault insurance
records, workers' compensation records, unemployment or
reemployment records, medical or other health care information,
school records, employment and/or personnel records. These re-
cords should show the amount of health care expenses incurred,
whether someone has been disabled and unable to work or attend
school, and whether someone had a pre-existing, or subsequently
acquired, disability.20 Most importantly, an independent medical
21
examination of the claimant ought to be performed.
17. MINN. STAT. § 65B.51, subd. 1 (1996).
18. MINN. R. Crv. P. 26.02(d).
19. See MINN. R. Crv. P. 36.
20. See Nemanic v. Gopher Heating & Sheetmetal, Inc., 337 N.W.2d 667
(Minn. 1983); Lindner v. Lund, 352 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Kissner v.
Norton, 412 N.W.2d 354 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Safinia v. Kruse, No. C8-96-1623,
1997 WL 118200 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 1997), review denied, (Minn. May 28,
1997).
21. See MINN. R. CIv. P. 35.
1998l
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In Lindner, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that claim-
ant's proof was not sufficient to prove disability of 60 days or more,
stating as follows:
In their Answers to Interrogatories and depositions, [the
claimants] have not presented sufficient evidence to raise
a genuine issue of material fact. In his deposition, [the
claimant] stated he missed out on some family activities
because of neck pain or headache. [The claimant] also
stated that his ability to work as a truck driver was re-
stricted because of the pain. [The claimant] indicated he
was not confined to bed or hospitalized and was confined
to the house for only three days. This does not reach the
severity required to raise a jury issue on whether he has
been unable to engage in substantially all of his usual and
customary daily activities.
It behooves the claimant to provide detailed Answers to Inter-
rogatories specifying the number of days hospitalized, the number
of days confined to bed, the number of days off work or on re-
duced work hours, the general interruption in one's life, the ex-
pert's opinions on permanency, whether the claimant was scarred
and the claimant should provide a detailed itemization of the
health care expenses incurred. That way, the claimant is proving
tort thresholds and her right to recover both economic and non-
economic damages.
2. Depositions
As a practical matter, depositions in motor vehicle accident
cases are of little help to the claimant seeking to prove a tort
threshold. Depositions can be used to prove the negligence and
cause facts and can be used to accentuate the severity of an acci-
dent. To the extent they can be used to prove 60 days of disability,
scars and health care expenses, the claimant may consider noticing
depositions to prove these issues.
On the other hand, depositions for the person defending
against a claimed tort threshold may be an invaluable tool. Deposi-
tions can be used to discover prior or subsequent accidents or un-
related, collateral causes of a claimant's disability, permanent injury
or the fact that the claimant is not severely injured from the acci-
dent.
23
22. Lindner, 352 N.W.2d at 70.
23. See generally Lindner v. Lund, 352 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984);
[Vol. 24
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D. Motion Practice
In the appropriate case, the claimant may bring a motion for
partial summary judgment seeking a judicial determination that a
tort threshold or tort thresholds have been met.2 4  Please note,
however, that a motion for partial summary judgment on a tort
threshold is akin to arguing that a claimant is entitled to a directed
verdict on a tort threshold because no medical or chiropractic tes-
timony was offered to refute a claim of permanent injury, disability,
or health care expenses in excess of a given number.
Generally speaking, issues concerning whether a tort threshold
has been met cannot be resolved on summary judgment motions. 6
Whether an injury is permanent is generally a question that ought
to be given to the jury.
27
E. Trial
1. Proving Tort Thresholds
From a claimant's perspective, it is prudent to present evi-
dence of as many tort thresholds as is possible. That means that
the claimant should produce evidence of 60 days of disability, per-
manent injury and health care expenses in excess of $4,000, and
that disability, permanent injury, and amount of health care ex-
penses should all be proved through the appropriate lay and expert
witnesses. Future health care expenses may not be considered to-
ward the $4,000 health care expense threshold.
Disability for 60 days or more is the "inability" to engage
in substantially all the injured person's usual and custom-
ary daily activities .... The 60 day requirement is cumula-
tive and does not require 60 consecutive days of disabil-
Murray v. Walter, 269 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1978); Nemanic v. Gopher Heating &
Sheetmetal, Inc., 337 N.W.2d 667 (Minn. 1983); Safinia v. Kruse, No. C8-96-1623,
1997 WL 118200 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 1997), review denied, (Minn. May 28,
1997).
24. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 56.04.
25. See Gale v. Howard, 413 N. W. 2d 234 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
26. See Carl v. Pennington, 364 N.W.2d 455 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
27. See Lindner v. Lund, 352 N.W.2d 68, 70 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); see also
Carufel v. Steven, 293 N.W.2d 47 (Minn. 1980).
28. See Coughlin v. LaBounty, 354 N.W.2d 48, 51 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), re-
view denied, (Minn. 1985).
19981
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ity.
29
It is not inconsistent for a jury to find that a claimant did not
sustain a permanent injury but that the claimant sustained medical
expenses in excess of the appropriate health care expense thresh-
old.5 °
2. Defending against Tort Thresholds
Normally, one defends against a tort threshold by retaining a
medical expert to examine the claimant and her medical records,
and to offer opinions that no permanent injury was sustained, that
the health care expenses are not causally related to the accident, or
are not reasonable or necessary. The health care expert can also
offer testimony on whether the claimant was disabled for 60 days,
or more, or has been disfigured from the accident.
There is no requirement that a defendant introduce
medical testimony to refute the claim of injury if it can be
accomplished by cross-examination.'
When there is a fact issue as to whether a tort threshold has
been met, even where no expert has been presented to counter the
claim of the tort threshold, it is for the jury to determine whether
the tort threshold has been satisfied. This statement of the law was
best stated by the Minnesota Supreme Court as follows:
Where an issue is raised as to whether a threshold re-
quirement of § 65B.51, subd. 3 was satisfied, the question
should be submitted to the jury as part of the special ver-
dict .... [E]xpert opinion, even in the absence of an ad-
verse expert, was not conclusive on the jury, and it was not
bound to accept it .... [C]ross-examination of the plain-
tiffs medical expert, the sole expert at trial, may be suffi-
cient to raise a fact question, precluding directed ver-
dict .... [I]n a personal injury case, where a plaintiff
produces an expert witness to support the elements of his
negligence cause of action, it is not mandatory for defen-
dant to introduce an adverse medical expert to create fac-
tual issues if he can sufficiently raise such issues through
cross-examination of plaintiffs expert and/or plaintiffs
29. Lindner, 352 N.W.2d at 70.
30. See Zieminski v. Caauwe, 354 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
31. Gale v. Howard, 413 N.W.2d 234, 236 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Rud v.
Flood, 385 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
[Vol. 24
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past medical records.32
In sum, if the issue of a tort threshold is raised, it is for the jury
to decide whether the tort threshold has been satisfied. Directed
verdicts are disfavored.
As it regards uninsured motorist claims, please note that tort
thresholds apply.33 "Because the [claimant] is subject to the no-
fault thresholds when suing the tort-feasor, and because the [unin-
sured motorist] insurer takes the place of the liability insurer, it is
logical that the [claimant] must also meet one of the thresholds
when suing the [uninsured motorist] insurer."
34
3. Formulating the Special Verdict
It is very important for the claimant and the defense to submit
proposed special verdicts as to those tort thresholds which they be-
lieve the jury ought to consider.35 If the defense fails to raise the
defense of a tort threshold in his pleading, in discovery, and fails to
demand tort threshold questions on the special verdict form, the
trial court may, in its discretion, rule that the issue of the tort
threshold has been waived. Hence, it is very important that tort
threshold questions be placed on a special verdict form. 6
4. Perverse Verdicts
Sometimes the jury verdicts seem inconsistent.37 Some cases
are "soft tissue" in nature, are difficult to prove or disprove, and the
jury is forced to rely on the credibility of the witnesses. In these
cases, the credibility of lay and expert witnesses is critical. 8 It is in
these close cases where ajury may, for example, find no permanent
injury but find that the health care expense tort threshold was
32. Nemanic, 337 N.W.2d at 670.
33. SeeJohnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 574 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1998).
34. Id.
35. See Coughlin, 354 N.W.2d at 51; Murray, 269 N.W.2d at 50.
36. See generally MINNESOTA DIST. JUDGES ASS'N COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTION
GUIDES, MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES (CIVIL) JIG 600 (Michael K. Steen-
son & Peter Knapp, reps.) in 4 MINN. PRACnCE 403-05 & Spec. Verdict Form No. 8,
at 167-68 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1997).
37. See Rud v. Flood, 385 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Zieminski v.
Caauwe, 354 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Gale v. Howard, 413 N.W.2d 234
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Coughlin v. LaBounty, 354 N.W.2d 48 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984), review denied, (Minn. 1985).
38. See Rud, 385 N.W.2d at 360.
1998]
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met. While it may appear inconsistent, the purpose of several tort
thresholds is to give a claimant a variety of methods to prove that
she has been severely injured. The fact that one threshold was




Before a verdict is reduced pursuant to a party's comparative
fault, a no-fault offset - a deduction for basic economic loss benefits
- must be done. These offsets are usually done by stipulation or by
motion within 10 days after the verdict. After the verdict is offset
with the basic economic loss benefits paid to date, the comparative
fault statute is then used to determine the ultimate verdict.
III. EMPIRICAL STUDIES
A. Studies of Auto Injury Claims
Anecdotal evidence regarding motor vehicle injury claims is of
little value. In depth analyses and studies of motor vehicle claims
allows for more well grounded conclusions. In 1994, the Insurance
Research Council analyzed 62,000 claimants whose motor vehicle
injury claims were settled in the spring and summer of 1992. The
results of that analysis has been published and subsequently up-
dated. The major findings from the 1994 study on "Claiming Be-
havior and Its Impact On Insurance Cost" were divided into four
areas. In relevant part, this 1994 study stated as follows:
The incidence of bodily injury liability claims increased
16% between 1987 and 1992. More injury claims were
made even though there was a 12% drop in the incidence
of roadway crashes severe enough to produce a vehicle
damage claim. Taking into account the declining acci-
39. See Zieminski, 354 N.W.2d at 553.
40. See id.
41. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.51, subd. 1 (1996).
42. See INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, AUTO INJURIES: CLAIMING BEHAVIOR AND
ITS IMPACT ON INSURANCE COSTS (1994); INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN
AUTO INJURY CLAIMS, ANALYSIS OF CLAIM COSTS (1996); INSURANCE RESEARCH
COUNCIL, TRENDS IN AUTO INJURY CLAIMS, ANALYSIS OF CLAIM FREQUENCY (1996);
INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN AUTO INJURY CLAIMS, ANALYSIS OF CLAIM
FREQUENCY (2d ed. 1995); INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN AUTO INJURY
CLAIMS, ANALYSIS OF CLAIM COSTS (2d ed. 1995).
[Vol. 24
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dent rate, it appears that people involved in crashes were
about 32% more likely to file a bodily injury liability claim
in 1992 than they were five years earlier.
This comprehensive analysis from the Insurance Research
Council had four major findings which are excerpted as follows:
NATURE OF INJURY AND MEDICAL TREATMENT
More people are making bodily injury liability claims and
those who do so allege more different kinds of injury per
person than in previous years. A growing share of BI
claimants reported two or more types of injuries - 42% re-
ported two types of injuries (for example, a back sprain
and a minor laceration), and another 15% reported three
types of injuries (for example, a broken leg, a back sprain
and a minor laceration), compared to 37% and 12%, re-
spectively, in 1987.
More claimants reported sprain/strain injuries in 1992,
while fewer claimants reported non-sprain/strain inju-
ries .... Claims for sprains and strains of the neck, back
and other parts of the body, alone or in combination with
other injuries, were filed by 83% of all BI claimants in
1982, up from 75% of claimants five years earlier. Persons
making claims under the fault-based BI coverage were
more likely to allege a back or neck sprain than those
making claims under the non-fault-based PIP coverage.
ECONOMIC LOSSES AND PAYMENTS TO CLAIMANTS
Average economic losses and payments to auto injury
claimants have increased dramatically since 1977 ....
The average economic loss for BI claimants rose to $4,532
in 1992 from $1,162 in 1977. The average economic loss
for BI claimants increased in an average annual rate of
9.5% over the 15 year period, higher than the average an-
nual medical inflation rate of 8% over the same period.
Medical expenses accounted for about three-fourths of
the total economic loss generated by persons who made
claims under the BI and PIP coverages, the two major
43. INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, AUTO INJURIES: CLAIMING BEHAVIOR AND ITS
IMPACT ON INSURANCE COSTS 1 (1994).
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sources of auto insurance payment.
Rising medical expenses drive up the cost of auto injuries
in two ways -through direct reimbursement of the medical
bills and by leveraging the "pain and suffering" compo-
nent of payments made under fault-based liability cover-
ages. Under the BI coverage, for example, claimants in-
curred an average of $4,532.00 in economic losses (75%
of it medical expense) in 1992, and collected BI payments
averaging $8,460.00. The $3,928.00 payment in excess of
actual economic loss was for general damages or "pain
and suffering," but the general damage portion also is de-
termined largely by the amount of economic loss since
there are no objective ways of measuring "pain and suffer-
ing." Insurance claims adjusters typically offer to settle in-
jury claims for a multiple of the claimant's economic
losses, i.e., the sum of medical expense, wage loss, and
other out-of-pocket economic losses. On average, for in-
juries of all types, the overall payments amounts to nearly
twice the amount of the economic loss. That is, for BI
claimants reimbursement per dollar of economic loss av-
erage $1.87. That means a $100.00 increase in medical
expense incurred by the claimant translates into a $187.00
increase in the settlement value of the claim, on average,
providing the claimant with a general damages payment
equal to $87.00 for each $100.00 in economic loss.
When BI claims are categorized by size of economic loss, it
becomes apparent that the leveraging effect of medical
expense and wage losses has a stronger impact on the less
serious injuries. For claims where economic losses were
less than $2,000, the average BI payment was equivalent to
more than $3.00 in payment for every dollar of economic
loss incurred. Payment amounts increase with severity of
injury, but the payment per dollar of economic loss de-
clines. That means claimants with less serious injuries re-
ceive proportionally greater compensation for "pain and
suffering" than claimants who suffer much more serious
injuries.
ATTORNEY INVOLVEMENT
Attorney involvement in auto injury claims has increased
[Vol. 24
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significantly over the 15-year period between 1977 and
1992, rising from 31% for all coverages combined in 1977
to 46% in 1992 .... For BI claimants country-wide, the
percentage with attorneys rose from 47% in 1977 to 55%
in 1987 and to 57% in 1992. For PIP claimants, the per-
cent represented rose from 17% in 1977 to 31% in 1987
and 1992.
Countrywide, about 19% of BI claims involved the filing of
a lawsuit, but nearly all of the lawsuits were settled before
the cases went to trial. Only 1% of BI claimants were in-
volved in lawsuits that went to court, and 40% of those
court cases were settled before reaching a verdict. Thus,
only about six-tenths of 1% of all BI claims are decided by
ajudge or jury.
ATTORNEY INVOLVEMENT AND THE CLAIM
PROCESS
High levels of attorney involvement in auto injury claims
are associated with high auto insurance costs.
The study documents several reasons why the involvement
of attorneys is associated with higher auto injury costs.
One is that claimants with attorneys report more different
types of injuries than claimants without attorneys.... An-
other reason is that claimants with attorneys incur much
higher medical bills, even for injuries of the same type
and similar degrees of severity. Represented claimants
made much greater use of chiropractors, physical thera-
pists and out-patient visits to MDs.
For all types of injury combined, BI claimants with attor-
neys incurred economic losses (mostly medical bills) aver-
aging $6,391.00 per person and collected gross BI pay-
ments averaging $11,939.00. By contrast, BI claimants
without attorneys incurred economic losses averaging
$1,755.00 and collected BI payments averaging $3,262.00.
That's a difference in gross payment of $8,677.00. Thus,
if a BI claimant does not have access to health insurance
or auto insurance MP coverage, the total BI settlement of
$11,939.00 would result in a net payment to the claimant
of only $1,608.00 after the payment for attorney fees and
the cost of medical expenses. Nonrepresented claimants
1998]
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netted $1,507.00($101.00) less after paying for their much
smaller economic losses. Putting it another way, it costs the
auto insurance system an extra $8,677. 00 when an attorney was
involved, but the represented claimant received only $101.00
more net benefits. The rest went mainly to the attorney and
to the medical providers who treated the claimant."
It appears that the increase in claim frequency and increase in
claim costs experienced through the 1980s leveled off around 1992
and has been dropping slightly since 1992. The Insurance Re-
search Council noted as follows:
After steady increases in injury claims compared to prop-
erty damage claims through the 1980s, the trend appears
to have stabilized between 1992 and 1995. The latest data
show Americans make 29.5 bodily injury (BI) liability
claims for every 100 property damage (PD) claims. This
index - the ratio of the number of BI to PD claims paid -
measures the likelihood of an injury claim being paid,
given the occurrence of an accident serious enough to
cause some vehicle damage. Between 1980 and 1992, the
number of BI claims per 100 PD claims increased
64% .... In other words, a person involved in an acci-
dent that produced a PD claim in 1992 was 64% more
likely to have a BI claim than a similar person in 1980.
However, since 1992, the number has moved in a narrow
range from 29.4 in 1992 to 29.3 in 1993, 29.1 in 1994, and
29.5 in 1995.45
That same report discussed claim severity. It noted that the
average amount paid per BI claim in the early 1990s was $10,587.00
but declined to $9,917.00 in 1995.'
In another study, the Insurance Research Council calculated
the average bodily claim payments by state for the year 1993. In
1993, in Minnesota, the average bodily injury payment was
$19,532.00 - the fifth highest average BI claim payment of all 50
47
states.
To summarize all of this information, it appears that the num-
ber and costs of auto injury claims rose dramatically from the late
1970s through the 1980s until about 1992. Since that time the
44. Id. at 2-7 (emphasis supplied).
45. INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN AUTO INJURY CLAIMS, ANALYSIS
oF CLAIM FREQUENCY 1 (1996).
46. See id. at 2.
47. See INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN AUTO INJURY CLAIMS,
ANALYSIS OF CLAIM FREQUENCY 5 (2d ed. 1995).
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number of claims and the costs for claims has plateaued or
dropped slightly.
B. Tort Thresholds Work
There are a number of states that have no-fault automobile in-
surance. In the abstract of one article entitled No-Fault Approaches to
Compensating Auto Accident Victims, the author noted as follows:
... [N]o-fault can yield substantial savings over the tradi-
tional system, or may increase costs substantially, depend-
ing on the no-fault plan's provisions. Regardless of plan
provisions, all no-fault plans reduce transaction costs,
match compensation more closely with economic loss, re-
duce the amounts paid in compensation for non-
economic loss to less seriously injured people, and speed
up compensation.
No-fault systems typically also involve some sort of tort thresh-
olds. Tort thresholds can vary widely. A 1995 study concerning the
effectiveness of tort thresholds stated as follows:
"No-fault" automobile insurance plans are designed to
supplant the tort system by requiring motorists to pur-
chase no-fault insurance and allowing victims to file liabil-
ity insurance claims in tort suits only if their injuries ex-
ceed a legislated "tort threshold." While thresholds vary
among states, many are satisfied if the victim incurs medi-
cal expenses as low as a few hundred dollars. Using the
insurance claims data, we estimate the effectiveness of
several states' thresholds. We find that tort thresholds are
surprisingly effective: modest tort thresholds reduce the
number of successful tort claimants by half, and the strict-
est thresholds may exclude nine-tenths of potential claim-
ants. Moreover, we find little evidence of claimants "pad-
ding" their claims to exceed dollar thresholds.49
Minnesota has what would likely be described as "strict" tort
thresholds. Its requirement that health care expenses exceed
$4,000 is the exception, not the norm. Most health care expense
tort thresholds are substantially less. Studies performed by the In-
stitute for CivilJustice and the Insurance Research Council all seem
48. Stephen J. Carroll & James S. Kakalik, No-Fault Approaches to Compensating
Auto Accident Victims, 60J. RISK& INS. 265 (1993).
49. James K. Hammitt & John U. Rolph, Limiting Liability for Auto Accidents:
Are No-Fault Tort Thresholds Effective? 7 LAw & POL'Y 493 (1985).
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to indicate that there are benefits to having no-fault insurance and
that there are benefits to having tort thresholds.
IV. AUTO CHOICE REFORM ACT OF 1997
In April of 1997, a bill was introduced in the United States
Senate entitled the "Auto Choice Reform Act of 1997.""0 The
"Choice Auto Insurance System" has been described as follows:
Under a Choice Auto Insurance System, policy owners
elect to be insured under the traditional system or a speci-
fied no-fault plan. Those who opt for tort retain tradi-
tional tort compensation rights and liabilities. Those who
choose no-fault neither recover it, nor are liable to others,
for non-economic losses for less serious injuries incurred
in auto accidents. The plan does not affect existing insur-
ance coverage for property damage resulting from auto• 51
accidents.
Stephen Carroll's statement to the Senate was in response to a
study performed by Mr. Carroll and others. That study basically
states that the proposed Auto Choice Reform Act would give auto
insurance policy owners a choice between staying under their cur-
rent State's system or electing an absolute no-fault system.
In Minnesota, the premium savings, under Auto Choice Re-
form, would save policy owners who switch to absolute no-fault 30%
on their premiums. As to those policy owners who only have man-
datory coverages, in Minnesota, those minimally insured policy
owners would save in excess of 60% on premium. The conclusion
from this study was stated as follows:
The Choice Plan can deliver on its promise to offer dra-
matically less expensive insurance to policy owners willing
to give up access to compensation for non-economic loss
without affecting those who want to retain access to com-
pensation for all their losses, both economic and non-
economic. If insurers pass their cost savings onto policy
owners, the adoption of a Choice Plan would allow
Policy Owners who are willing to waive their tort rights
to save approximately 30%, on average, on their
automobile insurance premiums;
Policy Owners who prefer to retain their full tort rights
50. Auto Choice Reform Act of 1997, S.625, 105th Congress, 1st Sess. (1997).
51. See Statement of Stephen Carroll to the Commerce, Science, and Trans-
portation Committee of the United States Senate (July 17, 1997).
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to do so, at essentially2 the same cost as under their
State's current system.
In sum, it appears that the Auto Choice Reform Act of 1997 is
good legislative policy. Those people who purchase auto insurance
policies at the minimal levels will save. Their savings would then be
available to be spent on other more important needs. In addition,
those who want to retain their present auto insurance system, with
full tort rights, may choose to do so.
V. CONCLUSION
In Minnesota, tort thresholds must be pled and proven before
a claimant may recover non-economic damages. While nationwide
the frequency of auto claims and the amounts paid to resolve auto
claims has ceased rising, in Minnesota insurers pay more to resolve
bodily injury claims than in other states. Tort thresholds do work
nationally and in Minnesota. The proposed Auto Choice Reform
Act would result in a reduction in insurance premiums in Minne-
sota.
52. Id. at 7.
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